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INTRODUCTION
Appellant wishes

to

respond

to the

arguments

and

issues

brought up by Respondent that are erroneous and to the cases cited
that are inapplicable.
ARGUMENT
I.

RESPONDENT MISCHARATERIZES THE CASE.

Respondent incorrectly states that the issue presented for
review is whether a police officer "who is protected by the Utah
Civil Service Statutes [must] exhaust his administrative remedies
by first appealing the termination of his employment to the Civil
1

Service

Commission. ..even when

procedurally

correct

he

discharge

claims

involved

that
a

his

otherwise

personnel

practice

prohibited by the Utah Protection of Employees Act (the 'Whistleblower Statute')." (Emphasis added).
At issue is whether the Utah Civil Service Statutes do indeed
provide adequate protection for whistle-blowers.

Appellant, in

their brief, asserts that the statutes do not afford
protection and

that the Legislature enacted

the

sufficient

Whistle-blower

statute to provide the needed protection by specifically giving a
whistle-blower a judicial forum in which to present evidence, to
recover damages, court costs, attorneys fees, and to bring the case
before a jury.
Secondly, there is nothing in the record establishing that the
discharge of Hatton-Ward was "procedurally correct."

Respondent

attempts to characterize this case as a simple procedural employee
termination matter where, if the governmental agency jumps through
all

the

correct

hoops

and

fills

out

the

correct

forms,

the

procedure is correct and it is thus irrelevant that the basis for
the

procedure

untruths.
discharge.

even

taking

place

was

wrongfully

created

upon

In this case, Hatton-Ward's record did not warrant a
The Appellant can prove that the Police Department

coerced untrue statements from individuals by threatening them with
incarceration

in

order

to

acquire sufficient

data

to

justify

conducting an internal investigation of Hatton-Ward.
In Respondent's Statement of Facts, Respondent, by design or
by accident, does not list the primary events in chronological
2

order, thereby leading a cursory reader to believe that HattonWard

received

Mandamus.

a termination

letter

and

then

filed

a Writ

of

As shown by the dates, Hatton-Ward and others filed

their Writ in May of 1989, it was dismissed in June of 1989, and
he received a termination letter in October of 1989.
1989, well

within

the

statutory

limit of

180 days

In November
after

the

occurrence of the violation of the Whistle-blower statutue, HattonWard filed a civil action in district court.
II.

THE LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE APPELLANT TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES BEFORE SEEKIING JUDICIAL ACTION.
The Whistle-blower statute, § 67-21-3 Utah Code Ann., provides

the following:
(1) An employer "may not take adverse action against an
employee
because
the
employee...communicates
the
existence of any waste or public funds, property, or
manpower, or a violation or suspected violation of a law,
rule, or regulation adopted under the law of this
state...
(2) An employer may not take adverse action against an
employee because the employee has objected to or refused
to carry out a directive that the employee reasonably
believes violates the law of this state...
The remedies for an employee bringing an action under this
statute are found in § 67-21-4 Utah Code Ann. which states:
(2) An employee who alleges a violation of this chapter
may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive
relief or actual damages, or both, within 180 days after
the occurrence of the alleged violation of this chapter.
(3) An action begun under this section may be brought
in the circuit court or the county where the alleged
violation occurred, the county where the complainant
resides, or the county where the person against whom the
civil complaint is filed resides or has his principal
place of business.

3

(4) To prevail in an action brought under the authority
of this action, the employee shall establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the employee has
suffered an adverse action because the employee, or a
person acting on his behalf engaged or intended to engage
in an activity protected under Section 67-21-3.
The Whistle-blower statute clearly sets forth a time limit for
filing an action in court as well as the standard of proof to be
applied by the Court to the evidence presented by the employee.
The statute

does not mention

any

need

or even

preference

for

administrative action, nor does the statute mention any desire that
an administrative record be prepared.

The language of the statute

obviously intends for the Court to hear the case de novo and to
render a judgment based upon the evidence.

U.C.A. § 67-21-5.

The

statute does not limit the Court to only a review of the findings
of the Civil Service Commission.
Furthermore, § 67-19-30

of the Utah

Code Ann. states

as

follows:
(1)
Employees shall comply with the procedural and
jurisdictional requirements of this section, Chapter 46b,
Title 63, the Administrative Procedures Act, and Chapter
19a, Title 67 in seeking resolution of grievances.
(2)
All grievances based upon a claim or charge of
injustice
oppression,
including
dismissal
from
employment,
resulting
from
an
act,
occurrence,
commission, or condition shall be governed by Chapter
19a, Title
67 and
Chapter 46b, Title
63, the
Administrative Procedures Act.
The above statute does not state that it applies to Title 67,
Chapter 21, which contains the Whistle-blower statute.
above

grievance

jurisdictional

statute

and

the

Both the

Whistle-blower

statute were put into effect in 1989, yet the Legislature did not
mandate in either statute that administrative procedures were to
4

be used before bringing a civil action under the Whistle-blower
statute.
As support for its position that the Civil Service Commissison
should have first jurisdiction, Respondent cites to several cases
which

all

occured

Whistle-blower

several

statute.

years

before

the

enactment

of

the

For example, Erkman

v. Civil

Service

Commission of Provo City, 198 P. 2d 238 (Utah 1948) occurred more
than forty years before the Whistle-blower statute was placed in
effect and Fisher v. Civil Service Commission of Salt Lake City,
499 P. 2d 854 (1978) came down nearly ten years earlier than the
statute.

Respondent argues that these cases show that the courts

recognized that the Civil Service Commission should review whistleblower type of cases.

However, the use of these cases bolsters

Appellant's position that if the Civil Service Commission had been
effective in whistle-blower cases and if the administrative process
had

provided

the necessary

protection

for such employees, the

Legislature would not have perceived a need to enact a separate
Whistle-blower statute with a provision for a judicial forum and
presentation of evidence on a de novo basis.

The

Legislature

deliberately chose the procedural safeguards of direct court action
that were to be applied to whistle-blower type of cases.
Respondent argues that Appellant should have sought relief
first in a public hearing

before the Civil Service Commission and

that after the Civil Service Commission had had the opportunity to
exercise

its

jurisdiction,

then

the

Court

could

administrative decision. Respondent's Brief at 21.
5

review

the

The Whistle-

blower

statute

does

not

administrative decision-

limit

the

Court

to

a

review

of

an

The statute clearly states that the Court

shall hear the evidence, enter judgment, and award damages. There
is

no

need

or

underlying

policy

within

the

statute

whereby

Respondent Respondent cannot be allowed to impose upon the statute
limitations and requirements that do not exist.
Respondent accuses the Appellant of "intentionally" "avoiding"
and "depriving" the Civil Service Commission of its jurisdiction.
Such

an

allegation

is

untrue

and

presumptous.

There

is

no

statutory language nor is there case law informing Appellant that
he

was

to

procedures

have
for

first

sought

wrongful

relief

termination

through
due

to

administrative
whistle-blowing

activi ties,
III. APPELLANT RIGHTFULLY FILED A COURT ACTION UNDER THE WHISTLEBLOWER STATUTE.
Respondent accuses the Appellant of "intentionally" "avoiding"
and "depriving" the Civil Service Commission of its jurisdiction.
Such

an

allegation

is

untrue

and

presumptous.

There

is

no

statutory language nor is there case law informing Appellant that
he

was

to

procedures

have
for

first
wrongful

sought

relief

termination

through
due

to

administrative
whistle-blowing

acti vi ties.
This is a case about an employee who blew the whistle on the
Police

Department.

This

is not

an employee

termination

case

involving a mere grievance. The fact that his termination letter
instructed him to appeal the Police Department's decision to the
Commission within

five days is

immaterial.
6

According

to that

letter, Appellant was discharged for reasons other than whistleblowing activities.

Because Appellant believed that he had been

terminated because of his complaints of waste and because of his
filing of a Writ of Mandamus, Appellant rightfully believed that
the appropriate step to take was to bring an action in Court under
the Whistle-blowing statute and to follow the requirements of that
law.
The Respondent
"employee

insists on characterizing

termination" case

as

if a

change

this case as an
in semantics

will

somehow allow the Court to ignore the Whistle-blower statute and
automatically give the matter to the Civil Service Commission for
a

first

review

of

the

reasons

for

Appellant's

discharge.

Consequently, the facts leading up to Appellant's discharge, as
set out in Appellant's Brief, are relevant. (Respondent wants to
have Appellant's factual allegations stricken because there are no
citations to the record.

However, because Respondent brought a

Motion to Dismiss, the facts as alleged in the Complaint are to be
taken as true by the Court) Obviously, this is a case involving
more than a too-long mustache, as was the situation in Worral1 v.
Qgden City Fire Department, 616 P.2d 598 (Utah

1980).

(A case

cited by Respondent which does not even involve whistle-blowing
allegations). Appellant is not trying to "frame" his case in such
a

way

as

to

bypass

the

administrative

process.

Appellant's

allegations against the Respondent are serious and of the type that
the Whistle-blower statute was designed specifically to handle.

7

IV.

THE FEDERAL CASES CITED BY THE RESPONDENT ARE INAPPLICABLE.
The Respondent acknowledges that there are no Utah cases which

have determined whether or not the Whistle-blowing statute provides
that an employee may bring a civil action before a court for an
evidentiary hearing and a judgment without having to first proceed
through administrative channels resulting in only a judicial review
of the Commission's decision.

Respondent then argues that this

Court should look to federal decisions for guidance in interpreting
the Utah statute.
Respondent's argument is misplaced since the federal statutory
scheme differs substantially from that of the Utah.
United States International

In Borrell v.

Communications Agency, 682 F.2d 981

(D.C. Cir. 1982), a case upon which Respondent heavily relies, the
Court found that the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 ("CSRA,, ) did
not create a private right of action to enforce against reprisals
for whistle-blowing.

The Court consistently narrowed its findings

to apply to probationary employees who, under the statute, did not
have the right to appeal an administrative decision to the Merit
Systems Protection Board or to a judicial forum.
As discussed, the Utah Whistle-blowing statute does create a
private cause of action for a governmental
statute also provides for a judicial forum
evidence.

The Utah

statute

also sets

employee. The Utah
in which to present

forth

remedies that can be awarded by the Court.

the

damages

and

The Utah statute is

substantially different from the federal statute. In addition, the
federal cases used by Respondent were decided prior to enactment
8

of Utah's Whistle-blowing statute.

It is likely that if the Utah

legislature had wanted to follow the federal example and place the
statute within an administrative scheme, it would have done so.
Consequently, Respondent's assertion that federal decisions are
relevant is incorrect.
CONCLUSION
Respondent focuses its argument on the administrative
process put into place for determining whether or not an employee
was validly discharged.

Respondent ignores the statutory language

of

statute

the

Whistle-blower

and

asks

the

Court

to

create

additions and limitations upon the statute that were not provided
for in the language or in the intent.

Thus, Respondent argues

what, in its opinion, the Whistle-blower statute should state,
perhaps

in

the

hope

that

the

Court

will

bypass

the

actual

provisions of the statute.
Respondent asserts that the policy behind an administrative
scheme is more compelling than the policy underlying the Whistleblower statute: that government efficiency is more important than
an employee's right to a judicial hearing; that a chance for the
government to remedy a situation without judicial intervention is
more necessary than an employee's right to present his evidence in
Court; that the

Civil

Service Commission

should

be given

the

authority to compile a record for the Court to review, instead of
having the Court hear the evidence and enter its decision; and that
the

protection

of

the

effectiveness

9

and

authority

of

the

administrative scheme should take precedence over the protection
of an employee who had the courage to blow the whistle.
The Whistle-blowing statutory language should not be allowed
to be tortured
provisions.

and

twisted

and

left

void

of

its purpose

and

This Court must find that the Appellant had the right

under the statute to pursue direct court action and that he was not
compelled
tribunal.

to

first

place

his

case

before

an

administrative

Further, the Court must find that Appellant did not

waive or lose his opportunity to appeal or remedy the termination
decision by filing a Whistle-blower action pursuant to the statute.
For the reasons set forth above, and in Appellant's Brief,
Appellant

respectfully

requests the Court to deny

Respondent's

Motion to Dismiss and to reverse the decision made by the lower
court in order to permit Appellant to have his day
provided by law.
DATED the

7-

day of December, 1990.
SUZANNE M. DALLIMORE
AND ASSOCIATES
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in Court as

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the above REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
was served upon the following named below by depositing it, postage
prepaid, into the United States Mail.
Roger F. Cutler
Frank Nakamura
505A City and County Building
451 South State
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
DATED this

^

day of December, 1990.
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